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Abstract

This thesis explores the political context of Chile’s current immigration laws and policies, tracing
changes through the dictatorship of the late 20th century, the transition to democracy in 1991,
and up through the current administration. Using the backdrop of the Venezuelan migrant crisis,
focus is given to specific stipulations of current policies and the impact they have on arriving
migrants. A comparison with neighboring Argentina highlights key differences in policy
reactions and is used to argue that a new constitution is needed in Chile in order to effectively
respond to the arrival of over 250,000 Venezuelan migrants. Lastly, consideration is given to the
current protests in Chile and how a constitutional referendum, planned for April 2020, represents
a unique opportunity for Chile to amend its immigration policies. This thesis argues that Chile’s
1980 Constitution and the reigning immigration policy, Decree Law 1.094 of 1975, are
inherently authoritarian and antiquated pieces of legislation that prevent sensible and human
rights-based immigration reform in Chile.
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Introduction

South America is currently facing the largest migration crisis in the Western Hemisphere
in recorded history and it is not likely to stop in the near future. Following economic collapse,
political corruption, and widespread food and medicine shortages, over 5 million people have
fled Venezuela in search of better lives. Mostly travelling southeast through the continent, many
individuals and families have settled, albeit temporarily, in Colombia, Peru, Argentina, and
Chile. As any significant refugee flow is basically unprecedented in the region, these countries
have implemented different policies and attitudes in an attempt to respond to the constant arrival
of Venezuelans. The varied reactions and lack of a regional consensus come as a result of the
disparate historical contexts and political realities of South America, their past experiences with
immigration, and their historical development.
In the case of Chile, one of South America’s richest countries, Venezuelan migrants have
been met with restrictive policies and complex processes for procuring regularized status. Recent
legislation has made it harder for migrants to obtain necessary visas to enter and work in the
country, requiring Venezuelans to apply at the Chilean embassy in Caracas where they are
subject to month long waiting periods amid the bureaucratic collapse. Migrants have also
experienced deportation and harassment by border and immigration officials as well as a
growing anti-immigrant attitude among the population. These factors have pushed many
Venezuelans into unregularized and precarious situations.
The origins of Chile’s restrictive policy and the inability of progressive demcoratic
governments to change this reality, can be found in the country’s history of military dictatorship.
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From 1973 to 1990, General Augusto Pinochet and an armed forces junta supported by the
United States ruled Chile by decree, routinely violating human rights and espousing neoliberal
economic policies. Among the lasting impacts of this authoritarian period are two important
pieces of legislation: a constitution and an immigration law. In tandem, these documents
prescribe an extremely restrictive and security-oriented immigration framework in Chile,
defining migrants as potential threats and proposing criminal penalties for those with irregular
status, among many other things. Further, the highly contentious 1980 Constitution ensures the
continuity of Pinochet’s policies to this day and has defanged subsequent administrations
following the country’s transition to democracy.
The illiberal and authoritarian essence of Chile’s 1980 Constitution and the inordinately
restrictive elements of Pinochet’s 1975 immigration Law 1.094 represent fundamental obstacles
that prevent robust and progressive immigration reform in Chile.

Theoretical Framework

Tracing contemporary policy through political development is vital in exploring Chile’s
reaction to transnational migration, a multifaceted and often politicized phenomenon. It is helpful
to adhere to one framework of scholarship in order to explore how the arrival of migrants
impacts sovereign countries (in this case, Chile) and how these countries respond to the arrival of
non-citizens. Stephen Castles is one of the foremost scholars on contemporary migration,
specifically focusing on the economic and political dimensions of population movements in the
20th and 21st centuries. His 2009 book The Age of Migration provides a clear and precise
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framework for the many dimensions of this subject, from regional policy accords to methods of
control and security, and maintains a global and progressive point of view throughout.
This thesis focuses more on migration policies and attitudes in Chile than the “push”
factors that cause migrants to leave their countries of origin and the patterns that their
movements follow. While attention is given to the collapse of Venezuela and reasonings behind
the mass exodus, a general summary of the political and economic conditions is given rather than
a theoretical analysis of migrant decision-making processes. Therefore, it is more pertinent to
summarize research and theories about the structures that migrants face when they arrive in a
country of destination, and how and why those structures are formed. Castles and his co writers
explore this aspect in chapters eight and nine of his book, respectively titled “The State and
International Migration: The Quest for Control” and “Migration and Security”. Here, the author
explores various ways in which a state can try to control migration, whether they follow
restrictive (i.e. limiting the amount of migrants that can legally enter the country and impose
sanctions on irregular migration) or expansive (i.e. allow more legal entries and regularization
programs for those who lack status) political policy goals. Castles identifies and explains...
Key components of governmental strategies designed to better regulate immigration
flows… including employer sanctions enforcement, legalization or amnesty programmes,
temporary foreign-worker admissions programmes, asylum and refugee policies, regional
integration approaches, and measures against human smuggling and trafficking. (Castles
181)
Each of these stated methods of control can be found in the immigration policies of Chile and
serve as important keystones for identifying the core of the country’s stance on migration.

Schmidt 6

Due to the large amount of Venezuelan migrants fleeing across the Western Hemisphere
in recent years, the most relevant methods of control have been legalization programs and work
visa schemes. Legalization and amnesty refer to programs that offer irregular migrants (those
lacking official authorization or with lapsed status in their country of residence) a pathway to
regularize their status and even eventually gain citizenship. Oftentimes such programs include
providing proof of employment, language capabilities, back payment of taxes, or a clean criminal
record. Many progressive scholars laud these programs, noting that “legalized aliens generally
experience improvements in their overall socio-economic and employment prospects” as well as
increased ability to access safe housing, medical care, and education (Castles 186). In the context
of large-scale migration movements, such as the one Latin America is currently facing, offering
arrivals an opportunity to regularize their status and access key social services could be a factor
that prevents the establishment of refugee camps, disadvantaged minorities, and an increase of
crime in countries of destination.
Lastly, Castles offers some useful information about the impact of immigration policy on
minority formation and migrant incorporation into society. He argues that the historical
immigration background of a nation has a strong impact on its present policies. Under this
framework, Chile qualifies as a “classical immigration country” in which policies during the
colonial and early independence period “encouraged family reunion and permanent settlement
and treated most legal immigrants as future citizens” (Castles 250). In the case of Chile, a
majority of the population in the 18th and 19th centuries was formed by European migration,
mostly from Italy and Germany, in addition to the colonial vestiges from Spain. According to
Castles, the origin of classical immigration countries has resulted in policy and attitudes
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prioritizing regular and controlled migration with the goal of permanent residence and eventual
citizenship, rather than temporary admittances and short term protections.
The way in which a government, whether federal or municipal, engages with migrants is
vital to their ease of incorporation into society and ability to access social services: “cultural and
political interaction is negotiated around complex processes of inclusion and exclusion, and of
cultural transference” (Castles 258). Generally speaking, if policy is aimed at easing the
transition of migrants into the host country’s society, these migrants tend to experience far better
economic gains, humanitarian conditions, and harmony with native populations. These policies that may include housing vouchers, inclusion in local politics, mobilization of civil society
groups, access to education, among many others - represent the overall paradigm of restriction or
expansion in migration law just as much as residency policies and visa schemes do.

Developments During Dictatorship

The history of Chile was fundamentally altered on September 11, 1973 when the armed
forces deposed socialist President Salvador Allende in a C.I.A. backed coup d'etat. The military
established an authoritarian dictatorship, led by General Augusto Pinochet, that ruthlessly
persecuted its ideological rivals from 1973 until 1990, executing over 3,000 civilians and
torturing an estimated 10,000 (Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación). Strongly
influenced by Milton Friedman and “Chicago School” economics, Pinochet and his advisors
worked to enshrine neoliberalism in the legal foundations of Chile. Companies that had been
nationalized under Allende were sold to the highest bidder, social welfare programs and poverty
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reduction policies were slashed, and Friedman’s laissez-faire economic model reigned supreme,
free from government regulation and oversight (Letelier).
The Chilean Constitution of 1980, passed by a civilian plebiscite considered to be
fraudulent by the international community, allowed the dictatorship to ensure the continuity of its
political ideology and supremacy of the right wing even after the return to democracy in 1990.
While recent administrations have been able to eliminate some of the most anti-democratic
elements of the constitution, it is still the governing document of the country and strongly
impacts any and all policy put forth by the legislature. Provisions of the constitution have made it
nearly impossible for presidents, federal judges, and members of congress from both sides of the
political spectrum to replace Pinochet’s 1975 Decree Law No. 1.094. This law is the core of
Chile’s immigration policy and creates large institutional obstacles to the entrance,
regularization, and integration of immigrants into Chile.
These two important pieces of legislation adopted under an authoritarian dictatorship, the
1980 Constitution and 1975 Immigration Law, as well as the inability of Chilean governments to
overturn them after the return to civilian rule, are critical to understanding the contemporary
immigration policy of the Chilean state and its reaction to the arrival of large numbers of
Venezuelan migrants.

The 1980 Constitution and Entrenched Authoritarianism

Chile’s current constitution was ratified on March 11, 1981 and became effective upon
the return to civilian democratic rule nine years later on March 11, 1990 (Constitute Project). By
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the late 1970’s General Pinochet and his government junta were facing mounting international
criticism and accusations of human rights violations, and the dictatorship began drafting a new
constitution to institutionalize its power and present the façade of domestic legitimization. A
plebiscite in October 1980 gave citizens the option to vote for or against the proposed
constitution, and the “Sí” option won with 67 percent of the vote, delivering Pinochet a victory
that “became the cornerstone of the government’s claim to legitimacy” (Angell 32). However,
the process of the plebiscite was heavily tipped in favor of the dictatorship and the “Sí” vote:
opposition campaigns were outlawed, international bodies were not allowed to observe, there
were wide reports of voter fraud, and blank ballots counted for the “Sí” option (Bascuñán 199,
Angell 32). Consequently, the Constitution was approved and paved the path for the future of
Chilean politics.
The document of the constitution itself clearly entrenches the ideology and supremacy of
the military dictatorship in almost every aspect of procedural government. In his book
Democracy After Pinochet: Politics, Parties and Elections in Chile, Professor Alan Angell, the
emeritus chair of Latin American studies at Oxford University, describes what he calls the
“Pinochet Factor” in the Chilean Constitution:
The core of the Pinochet [Constitution] was the creation of an institutional and
constitutional structure to embody Pinochet’s ideas, values and policies. The constitution
of 1980 embodies his ideas of a state with a limited role, but with authoritarian controls
over democratic processes. (Angell 142)
The Pinochet Factor was manifested in many undemocratic “enclaves” of the constitution that
solidify the power of the military in the future of Chilean democracy. For example, the new
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congress would include nine senators nominated by the armed forces and a National Security
Council made up of military and police officials with advisory rights to the president, and it
prevented the president from removing the head of the armed forces. Most notably, the
constitution protected itself from reform by a future leftist government through the designated
senators, a proportionally biased electoral system that favored the right wing, and the
prerequisite of supermajorities to overturn certain laws and constitutional provisions. These
protected “leyes de amarre” (binding laws) prevented the government of the first democratically
elected president Patricio Aylwin from, among other things, prosecuting military personnel for
human rights violations, expanding social security programs, and amending Pinochet’s 1975
Immigration Law (Angell 142-4).

Decree Law 1.094 of 1975 and the National Security Doctrine

The military junta spent the first five years of the dictatorship unravelling the leftist
policies of Salvador Allende and replacing them with neoliberal economic plans and
authoritarian executive policies. While the University of Chicago-trained economists worked to
shrink state involvement and allow for uninterrupted free-trade capitalism, the dictatorship
asserted its absolute control over social and political matters. In 1975 the junta adopted Decree
Law 1.094 concerning Immigration, a law that remains in effect to this day. This law reveals
import influencing factors of the Pinochet regime, and its elements can be clearly seen in the
present policies governing the response to the Venezuelan refugee crisis.
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Decree Law 1.094 created a restrictive immigration framework that sought to limit the
number of arrivals into the country and strengthen border protection. This in and of itself is
somewhat unexpected due to the fact that scholarship on the politics of immigration has tended
to show dictatorships adopting more permissive policies. In the journal article The Politics of
Immigration: Dictatorship, Development, and Defense, Dr. Nikola Mirilovic summarizes the
common argument that the demand for migrant workers tends to be high in countries with an
authoritarian regime type and argues that the influx of these workers lowers wage costs and
expands the taxpayer base, increasing the profits of the business elite and the authoritarian state
alike. Further, this demand is usually higher than in countries with democratic regime types
because “dictatorships are less likely than democracies to treat access to entitlements as a
noncitizen’s right... [and] can deny immigrants access to the welfare state” (Mirilovic 274-5).
The Pinochet regime’s legislation ran contrary to this theory for two reasons. During most
of the 20th century, Chile did not experience any significant waves of labor-based migration
because its economy was at the very early stages of development and was not a premier
destination for South American workers. The second reason is based in a critical ideology of
Law 1.094 and the dictatorship in general.
Chile’s dictatorship and post-dictatorship immigration policy was framed in the context
of the National Security Doctrine (NSD). This Cold War-era ideology was exported from the
United States to the military dictatorships of Latin America and taught of the danger of an
“internal enemy” that usually took the shape of a communist guerilla. Following this doctrine,
the dictatorships of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and many other Latin American countries shifted
their military and policing attention from external threats to the domestic surveillance and
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persecution of leftist ideology. María Fernanda Stang, a professor at Chile’s Universidad Católica
Silva Henríquez who has published dozens of investigations on international migration in the
Southern Cone, traces the NSD ideology through Pinochet’s 1975 Law 1.094:
The [law] safeguarded the territorial border as an area through which "agitators" could
enter that could threaten the internal order [in Chile] — the territorial border became an
ideological frontier… within the idea of all-out war that guided the NSD, the enemy was
both internal and external. (Stang 87)1
The main goal of Law 1.094 was to stop the entry of any person ideologically opposed to the
Pinochet regime and continue the persecution of the state’s “enemies,” whether it be at the border
or in the cities.
The restrictive nature of the law and the influence of the NSD can be seen in its articles
and stipulations, a majority of which remain in function to this day. Article 15 specifies types of
immigrants prohibited from entry into Chile, namely “those who propose or propagate, through
written or spoken word or any other means, doctrines and ideologies that seek to alter or destroy
the social order or government system of the country” (Decreto Ley No. 1.094 3)2. This
designation further specifies union members, political activists, academics in the social sciences,
and those without “good moral behavior” as ineligible for entry, residence, or visa status in
Chile. Article 15 goes on to prohibit the entry of any person with criminal antecedents (no matter
the severity) and those who “cannot practice their profession” and would thus “constitute a

1

… [la ley] resguarda de la frontera territorial como espacio por el que podían ingresar “agitadores” que
podían amenazar este orden interno [en Chile] —la frontera territorial hecha frontera ideológica… [en] la
idea de la guerra total que guiaba la DSN, el enemigo era interno y externo a la vez.
2

Los que propaguen o fomenten de palabra o por escrito o por cualquier otro medio, doctrinas que
tiendan a destruir o alterar por la violencia, el orden social del país o su sistema de gobierno.

Schmidt 13

public charge to the Chilean state” (Decreto Ley No. 1.094 3)3. This designation, along with
accompanying requirements to prove income or gainful employment, follows the neoliberal logic
of the elimination of the welfare state, and can be seen in many current visa requirements for
Venezuelan refugees.
Another component of the law that remains startlingly relevant in the current situation is
the absolute executive authority regarding deportation. Article 2 grants the federal executive (the
military junta at the time of ratification) the authority to prohibit entry and deport any individual
or group “for reasons or interests of national security” with complete discretion (Decreto Ley
No. 1.094 1)4. Lastly, Law 1.094 allocates increased funding to border security measures and
authorizes the armed forces, the police (Carabineros), and the PDI (Chile’s federal investigative
force) to enact border control. Law 1.094 is one of the oldest immigration policies still enforced
in South America and has provided a framework for one of the most restrictive responses to the
influx of migrants seen throughout the region.

Democracy and the Challenges of Reform

Another milestone in Chilean history was reached on October 5, 1988 when Chilean
voters rejected Pinochet in a plebiscite regarding the future of governance in the country. The
1980 Constitution provided a framework for a return to democratic rule and the 1988 plebiscite
gave Chileans the option between eight more years of Pinochet (this time serving as an elected

3

Los que no puedan ejercer profesión u oficio… [y] constituir carga social [al estado Chileno].

4

por razones de interés o seguridad nacionales.
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president) or the establishment of parliamentary elections and a full return to civilian rule. A
strong opposition campaign and growing discontent with the dictatorship’s impunity contributed
to the “No” option winning with nearly 56 percent of the vote. Many international factors, such
as the end of the Cold War and the adoption of a human rights paradigm into U.S. and global
foreign policy, led the military junta to respect the results of the plebiscite, and on March 11,
1990, Patricio Aylwin was sworn in as the first democratically elected president in over 16 years
(Angell 32-3).
The presidential election of 1989 represented a victory for the broad coalition of center
left parties called the concertación that won a slight majority in both chambers of the congress.
Nevertheless, “the left was hit badly by the electoral system and the representation of [leftist]
parties in congress [was] lower than it would have been on the traditional electoral system,”
giving the concertación a congressional majority but not nearly enough to reform the leyes de
amarre or the constitution itself, which required a two-thirds vote in both houses (Angell 48-49).
Parties on the center and far right did not have any political motivation to change a system rigged
in their favor, and many still stayed loyal to Pinochet, who remained as the commander in chief
of the armed forces. Although the dictatorship was no longer running the show in Chile, the
entrenched authoritarianism of the constitution functioned as planned and ensured the continuity
of neoliberal economics and an immigration policy dictated by the National Security Doctrine.
Patricio Aylwin and the subsequent center-left governments of Eduardo Frei, Ricardo
Lagos, and Michelle Bachelet claimed modest successes in reforming some of the authoritarian
enclaves of the constitution and proposing more humanitarian laws. The first significant set of
amendments to the constitution came in 2005 under the administration of Ricardo Lagos.
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Although the leftist coalition still lacked a supermajority, an erosion of pinochetismo and military
loyalty among the center-right parties allowed for a compromise to eliminate some of the most
anti-democratic elements of the constitution. The agreement eliminated the designated senators,
reduced the influence of the national security council, increased the number of deputies in the
lower chamber of congress, and allowed the president to dismiss the commander in chief of the
army (Fuentes 100). Additional advances made by these administrations included investigative
truth-seeking reports about human rights violations committed by the dictatorship and an
increased equilibrium of power with the armed forces. Despite the advances made in
constitutional reforms, the supermajority requirement and weak political will left Law 1.094
untouched and in full effect.

Immigration Projects and Policy: 1993 - 2013

The model of immigration policy in Chile has shifted in the last three decades throughout
various democratically elected political administrations, but it has remained tethered to the
framework of Law 1.094.
Many factors, including the implementation of a more moderate version of neoliberal
economics, led to a boom in Chile’s development beginning in the early 1990’s. The expanding
middle class and high regional wages increased the demand for foreign imports, and many
international companies began investing in the country (Ffrench-Davis). This steady economic
growth, stronger than in many other countries in the region, naturally made Chile a popular
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destination for South American migrant workers looking for better opportunities. The subsequent
boom in the immigrant population was significant:
After 1992 the foreign-born population grew by over one third and by 2002 Chile had the
largest absolute number of foreign-born ever recorded… [and] by 2009 this population
almost doubled again, growing 91% in seven years. (Doña-Reveco, “Policy and
Development” 5)
This expansive growth resulted in a foreign-born population of over 300,000 in 2009, about 2
percent of Chile’s total population. For a relatively small country, such a large percentage change
of arriving migrants in less than two decades yielded a demographic shift and calls for
appropriate policy reaction. Political alternation has trended towards the center-left and
center-right since Chile’s return to democracy, but the five subsequent administrations have taken
differing approaches in responding to the new age of migration and tackling the fundamental
obstacle of Law 1.094.
The first attempt at modernizing Chile’s immigration framework was introduced by
President Patricio Aylwin in 1993. Proyecto de Ley Sobre Migraciones No. 2.891 recognized that
Law 1.094 “not prepared to respond to the growing challenges Chile will face in relation to the
movement of people” and instead proposed “a framework of rules, processes, practices,
decisions, and bureaucratic routines” to regularize immigration (Stang 91)5. Due to the
constitution’s majority requirements, Aylwin’s law was soundly rejected by senators from the
Renovación Nacional and Unión Demócrata Independiente parties (center-right and far-right,

5

No se encontraba preparada para responder a los crecientes desafíos que Chile enfrentaría en relación
con la movilidad de las personas… un entramado de reglas, procedimientos, prácticas, decisiones, en
fin, rutinas burocráticas.
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respectively) and eventually shelved in 1997. However, the attempt to shift Chile’s immigration
paradigm away from the restrictive NSD and towards a regulated and bureaucratic system served
as a template for more robust proposals that followed.
Socialist President Michelle Bachelet claimed the biggest victory in reforming Chile’s
immigration policy in 2008 with the Instructivo Presidencial No. 9. Albeit not a formal law, this
set of directives injected the philosophy of human rights into the visa, refugee, and social
policies in Chile. According to Cristián Doña-Reveco, a scholar of Southern Cone migration at
the University of Nebraska, the biggest contribution of this “proto-document” was the guarantee
“to provide equal access in the public system to health, education, housing and crime protection”
regardless of the legal status of a migrant (Doña-Reveco, “Policy and Development” 6). In
addition, Bachelet reaffirmed Chile’s commitment to an important international accord from the
United Nations: the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Based on the reasoning
that “Chile needed to repay a debt of solidarity to the rest of the world for having received the
half million exiles of Pinochet's dictatorship,” the government increased the number of refugees
it would accept for resettlement within Chile and further expanded their social rights (Levinson).
These advances marked a strong step towards a more expansive and accepting immigration
paradigm in Chile, but the fact that they were executive directives and can easily be overturned
has in part contributed to the precarity that migrants and refugees entering the country face today.
The last notable effort to deliver comprehensive immigration reform before the start of
the Venezuelan migrant crisis came from current president Sebastián Piñera during his first term
in office. The first right-wing President to be elected since the return to democracy, Piñera
proposed Proyecto de Ley de Migración y Extranjería No. 8.970 in 2013. This law included
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some of the human rights-oriented aspects of the Instructivo Presidencial No. 9 but was a
decidedly more conservative piece of legislation. Primarily concerned with the economic facet of
migration, Ley 8.970 was a response to “pressures from specific business sectors, namely those
dedicated to the export of agricultural products, due to their need for temporary and cheap labor
for unskilled work” (Stang 97)6.
This proposal would have created new and specific visa categories for temporary workers
while maintaining limited pathways to permanent residency and citizenship. Stephen Castles
refers to this policy approach as a “guest worker” paradigm and highlights the state’s desire to
reduce the number of migrants with irregular status and reap the benefits of their labor without
integrating them into society in the long term (Castles 188). Though it was never passed in the
congress, this policy project saw the return of a desire for restriction and control regarding
immigration and set the stage for the logic of current proposals.

The Venezuelan Migrant Crisis

Repeated failed attempts to significantly reform the constitution and replace Law 1.094
has left the Chilean immigration framework woefully underprepared for the country’s largest
influx of foreign migrants in its history: those fleeing political and economic chaos in Venezuela.
The unprecedented outflow of migrants from Venezuela has tested the hospitality of almost every
nation in South America and, especially in the case of Chile, highlighted flaws in immigration
and border policies. When Law 1.094 was unilaterally implemented by the dictatorship in 1975,
6

la presión de ciertos sectores empresariales, concretamente el dedicado a la exportación de productos
agrícolas, por la necesidad de mano de obra temporal y más barata para labores no calificadas.
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a mass migration as large in scale as the Venezuelan crisis would have been practically
inconceivable, and thus the 45 year old law prevents any pragmatic approach that reflects the
values and interests of a modern and democratic Chile. The institutional barriers that have kept
Law 1.094 intact despite years of attempted reform have also contributed to what Doña-Reveco
calls a “policy of no policy” of immigration in which progressive and adaptive initiatives are
defanged by an intrinsically conservative core law. Lastly, the ability of migrants (especially
Venezuelans) to integrate and flourish within the Chilean society and economy has been
significantly hampered by the lack of a concise federal policy.

Background: The Collapse of Venezuela and Push Factors

The origins of what has been called one of Latin America’s worst humanitarian crises and
its resulting ramifications can be found in the 1999 election of Hugo Chávez and the mandate of
his successor, Nicolás Maduro, beginning in 2002. Chávez developed a uniquely Venezuelan
concept of democratic socialism called Bolivarianism to advocate for expanded social services to
the people and increased Latin American cooperation while rejecting capitalist inequality and
U.S. imperialism in the economic sphere. Chávez, and later Maduro, used Venezuela’s vast oil
profits to fund social initiatives and invest in the development projects of those who shared his
vision for the country.
The downturn and eventual collapse of Venezuela can be traced through the following 15
or so years in political and economic terms. In the realm of political culture, the populist
tendencies of Chávez became increasingly authoritarian in tone and in framing himself as “what
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it is to be Venezuelan, opposition to Chávez became opposition to Venezuela itself”
(Swaminathan). Crackdowns on the opposition became worse after the death of Chávez in 2002,
and the regime of current President Nicolás Maduro is widely classified as authoritarian by the
international community. According to the Freedom House Freedom in the World report from
2018:
Venezuela’s democratic institutions have deteriorated since 1999, but conditions have
grown sharply worse in recent years due to a concentration of power in the executive and
harsher crackdowns on the opposition… government corruption is pervasive, and law
enforcement has proven unable to halt violent crime. The authorities have restricted civil
liberties and prosecuted perceived opponents without regard for due process. (Freedom
House)
Repression of the opposition has caused many Venezuelans to lose their faith in the Bolivarian
project of Chávez, and Maduro has proved incapable of replicating the populist galvanization of
his predecessor or garnering any substantial public support. Many spectators attribute the
continued survival of the regime to the support of the armed forces as well as China and Russia
(Gedan 63).
During the last two decades, Venezuela has undergone a sharp economic decline that,
paired with political instability, has pushed millions of people to leave the country. Chávez’s use
of profits from the state-owned oil reserves brought about entrenched corruption and when oil
yields began to slow, so did the economy at large. The total amount of oil produced in Venezuela
fell by more than 30 percent between 2015 and 2018, and accelerated by a global fall in oil
prices and the fact that “a sizeable portion of Venezuela’s oil exports is shipped to creditors to
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repay loans, generating no income whatsoever,'' the economy has gone into a tailspin (Gedan
58). In 2018 alone, the economy contracted over seven percent, inflation surpassed 1,000
percent, and GDP fell dramatically (Gedan 57). This has had immediate and tangible impacts on
the Venezuelan people: high unemployment and a plummeting currency have made vital imports,
such as food and medicine, impossibly expensive. According to in-country reports, “10 million
Venezuelans now eat one or two meals per day… [and] 85 percent of medicines [are]
unavailable, including antibiotics and painkillers” (Gedan 58). Millions of people are at risk of
starvation and those seeking medical care often face life-threatening infections.
The exodus from Venezuela started in the early 2000s with those ideologically opposed to
Bolivarianism (mostly business owners and the capitalist elite) and has since expanded to
represent a cross section of all social echelons as the economy and rule of law have collapsed.
According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, as of 2019 over four million Venezuelans
have fled the country and “globally, Venezuelans are one of the single largest population groups
displaced from their country” (United Nations). The biggest group of migrants, about 1.3
million, can be found in neighboring Colombia, followed by Peru with over 800,000, and Chile
with approximately 288,000 (United Nations). The arrival of such a significant number of
migrants is unprecedented in Latin American countries and has presented a myriad of political,
social, and economic challenges.

Venezuelan Migrants in Chile: Pull Factors and Demographics
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Of the estimated four million Venezuelans who have fled their country in the last five or
so years, roughly 10 percent have made their way to Chile. Despite the geographical distance
from Venezuela, Chile’s appealing “pull” factors have influenced the decisions of many
Venezuelans to come to the country. Compared to the current economic and political turmoil in
Venezuela, Chile is quite stable. According to Freedom House, “Chile is a stable democracy that
has experienced a significant expansion of political rights and civil liberties since the return of
civilian rule” and democratic tenets such as due process and a plurality of political ideas are
commonplace (Freedom House). In addition, many Venezuelans distrustful of the left-wing
populism of Chávez and Maduro support the more centrist political spectrum in Chile, especially
the center-right administration of Sebastián Piñera (Guzman). The World Bank has classified
Chile as Latin America’s fastest growing economy and praised the 25 percent reduction of
poverty since 2000 as well as policies to protect against fluctuations in the global price of copper,
the country’s main export (World Bank). These political and economic characteristics have made
Chile an attractive destination for many migrants seeking opportunity and stability.
Beginning in 2012, Chile began to experience a gradual uptick in visa applications from
Venezuelan citizens and by 2015 the rate was skyrocketing. In a six year span, Chile saw an
11,000 percent increase in visa applications from Venezuelans, from 1,249 in 2012 to 145,449 in
2018 (Departamento de Extranjería y Migración). This statistic fails to capture the entire scope
of the influx as there was an estimated population of 288,000 Venezuelans in the country as of
2018, leaving a difference of well over 150,000 people in situations of irregular or lapsed status.
Of these arrivals, about 40 percent are ages 18-45, 53 percent are male, and 71 percent reside in
the Santiago metropolitan area (Departamento de Extranjería y Migración). The relatively young
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and urban demographic of Venezuelan migrants is representative of the fact that many are
well-educated professionals sending money back to their families. These funds, known as
remittances, totalled over 150 million USD in 2017 and are expected to rise in proportion to the
Venezuelan population in Chile (International Organization for Migration).
Another important factor in the type of migrants arriving to Chile is geography: Santiago
is more than 4,500 miles (7,300 kilometers) from Caracas, and the journey is neither cheap nor
easy. According to the president of the Migration Policy Institute, Andrew Selee:
Geography dictates that [Chile] attracts wealthier Venezuelans… a very well-educated
group, [while] the most vulnerable populations, the most sick or who have malnutrition,
are not going to be able to travel the distance… they’re likelier to end up in Colombia or
Peru. (Guzman 6)
Despite the professional qualifications of many of the Venezuelan migrants arriving in Chile,
they face immense difficulties in finding relevant employment or even securing a regularized
status that allows them to work. After making the long and arduous journey to Chile in hopes of
safety and stability, Venezuelans are met with an increasingly obsolete immigration framework
that pushes many into vulnerable positions and curtails their human rights and economic
potential.

State Reactions and the Nueva Ley de Migraciones

Since the first arrivals of Venezuelan migrants, the Chilean state’s response to the crisis
has focused on amending, rather than replacing, Law 1.094 and the executive policies adopted
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over the past two decades. In the case of the 2018 Nueva Ley de Migraciones, specific policy
reactions to the arrival of hundreds of thousands of migrants do little more than modernize the
existing restrictive systems in place. At its core, this proposal is less of a law and much more of a
cosmetic overhaul of visa classifications that nonetheless jeopardizes the fate of many
Venezuelans. Moreover, the paradigm of the Nueva Ley appears to be a curious mix of
progressive rhetoric and elements of the restrictive philosophy of Law 1.094. Currently, this law
is under discussion by the Chilean congress and many of its stipulations are in effect through
executive decree. The specifics of this law, many of which uniquely apply to Venezuelan
migrants, represent a continuation of the decades old status quo in Chile’s immigration policy
and fail to incorporate necessary human rights considerations.
The Nueva Ley (officially called Reforma Migratoria y Política Nacional de Migraciones
y Extranjería) was introduced during center-right president Sebastián Piñera’s second
non-consecutive term in office which began in 2018. The proposal of the law is centered around
“secure, well-organized and regulated” migration to combat precariousness in the labor and
housing markets, human trafficking, and abuse of the existing immigration system (Ministerio
del Interior 1)7. The text of the proposal begins with an obvious, albeit important, recognition of
the urgency of the immigration situation in Chile. After summarizing statistics of migrant
arrivals (over 1 million in 2017) as well as percentages of the population at large (over 5.5
percent), the policymakers go on to recognize that “the outdated immigration framework, from
1975, does not contain the principles, institutionality, or the flexibility necessary to adequately
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segura, ordenada y regular.
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safeguard the interests of the country or the rights of migrants” (Ministerio del Interior 1)8. The
stated recognition of the insufficiencies of Law 1.094 is an important step in building a
consensus in the political mainstream (parties across the political spectrum support broad
immigration reform), but the proposals that follow in the Nueva Ley fail to reform the most
conservative elements of Pinochet’s law and, in some instances, put forward new restrictions.
In the first clause of the working proposal, the Nueva Ley promises “fair and humane
treatment to regularized migrants and those fleeing persecution”. The specification of
“regularized” migrants is key in this context, given that the very next clause advocates for a
“strong hand” in dealing with “irregular and clandestine entry into the country” (Ministerio del
Interior 2)9. This distinction in attitude and obligations based on legal status harkens to the
philosophy of the National Security Doctrine, in which migrants entering the country without
authorization are seen as an inherent threat that must be dealt with criminally. Instead of framing
irregular migration as a negative phenomenon based on the precarity that accompanies it (less
access to health care, education, housing, etc.) the law instead conflates migrants lacking official
status with drug dealers and human traffickers, a harmful and baseless claim that often
contributes to anti-immigrant backlash.
In the proposal’s ninth directive, the law urges decriminalizing irregular entries in order
to comply with international accords, but soon after authorizes “expedited expulsions… of those
who have infringed upon the migration laws” and limits the appeal timeframe for deportation to
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… una regulación migratoria anticuada, que data de 1975, que no recoge los principios, la
institucionalidad, ni la flexibilidad necesaria para resguardar debidamente los intereses del país ni los
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Trato justo y humano a los migrantes regulares y a los perseguidos… Mano dura… para luchar contra
el ingreso irregular y clandestino al país.
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only seven days (Ministerio del Interior 3)10. Infractions that can lead to expulsion include
entering the country through unauthorized passages, providing false information to border
officials, and using altered documentation or identification belonging to someone else. These
stipulations apply to many Venezuelan migrants who cannot obtain accurate or up to date
documentation due to the bureaucratic collapse in their home country and often are forced to
reckon with isolated and dangerous land border crossings due to a lack of available funds for air
travel.
The restrictions on migrants with irregular status also extend to those with lapsed status
and limit the possibilities for regularization. The law’s eighth directive proposes a “radical
change [in] procedure for obtaining temporary residence” wherein residential status can only be
solicited at the Chilean consulate in the migrant’s home country, a requirement that “prohibits the
change of immigration status… from inside Chile” (Ministerio del Interior 3)11. Once again, this
requirement has a disproportionate impact on migrants without the resources to afford round trip
travel to solicit a status change as well as Venezuelans for whom return is not an option. In the
long-term, increased difficulty in obtaining permanent residency will yield a larger population of
migrants with irregular status, leaving thousands in vulnerable positions in the labor and housing
market.
The Nueva Ley does, however, establish a regularization program for migrants with
irregular or lapsed status who entered Chile during a specific timeframe. According to the
program subsection within the law, migrants lacking any kind of authorization as well as those
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Expulsión expedita para aquellos extranjeros que hayan infringido la ley migratoria.
El proyecto de ley cambia radicalmente la operatoria que hoy existe para la obtención de residencia
temporal, ya que ésta sólo se podrá solicitar fuera de Chile, prohibiendo que se pueda solicitar el cambio
de calidad migratoria de turista a residente estando en Chile.
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with expired tourist or residency visas who entered the country before April 8, 2018, can apply
for temporary residency from within Chile. While this program paves a road for stability for
some migrants, it is very limited in scope and contains many of the hallmark drawbacks of
amnesty programs. First, the established time frame was very short; migrants with expired tourist
or residency visas had to “register and apply before the Subsecretary of the Interior... within 90
days of April 23, 2018” while those who entered the country illegally had to do so within 30
days (Ministerio del Interior 5-6)12. This short time frame for applications, as well as the 70,000
CLP fee (about $90 USD), inherently limited the number of migrants able to submit the
necessary documentation, and put a strain on an already under resourced immigration
bureaucracy in Chile.
Stephen Castles elaborates on another more psychological impediment of legalization
programs: “Many eligible aliens [do] not know about legalization programmes or fear to
participate in it…” despite the fact that “legalized aliens generally experience improvements in
their overall socioeconomic and employment prospects” (Castles 185-6). The potential
consequences of noncompliance with the terms of the legalization program are clearly spelled
out in the Nueva Ley: “Foreigners with irregular status who do not present proper regularization
applications within the previously signaled time frame will be deported” (Ministerio del Interior
6)13. The threat of deportation is mentioned over 10 times in the six page draft of the Nueva Ley,
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Registrarse y solicitar ante la Subsecretaría del Interior… dentro del plazo de 90 días corridos a contar
del 23 de abril de 2018
13

Los extranjeros en situación irregular que no presenten solicitudes de regularización dentro del plazo
señalado anteriormente serán expulsados.
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a testament to the restrictive and control-oriented philosophy behind the proposal and, moreover,
marking continuity with the core of Law 1.094.
The most direct reaction to the Venezuelan crisis contained in the Nueva Ley is the
creation of the Visa of Democratic Responsibility (VDR). One of seven new visa categories
proposed in the law, the VDR is essentially a one year residency permit that can be renewed only
once. According to the law, the creation of this specific visa is a response to “the democratic
crisis that Venezuela is currently going through, and which seriously affects the nationals of [the]
country” (Ministerio del Interior 5)14. Many see the direct condemnation of Venezuela’s
democracy as a political maneuver by president Sebastián Piñera, a conservative who is
ideologically opposed to the ruling party in Venezuela and in early 2019 refused to recognize the
legitimacy of Nicolás Maduro’s mandate (The Santiago Times).
Nevertheless, the VDR does not offer much of a lifeline to those fleeing starvation and
violence in Venezuela. Notably, any Venezuelan national who has any kind of criminal record is
unequivocally ineligible for the VDR. Considering Venezuela’s skyrocketing rates of petty crime
due to widespread shortages, this stipulation excludes a significant portion of the population. In
addition, the VDR maintains similar solicitation requirements to the permanent residency status,
in that the visa “must be applied for at the Chilean consular authority in Venezuela… [with] a
valid or expired passport granted after 2013” (Ministerio del Interior 5)15. The bureaucratic
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… la crisis democrática por la que actualmente atraviesa Venezuela, y que afecta gravemente a los
nacionales de[l] país.
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Deberá ser solicitada ante la autoridad consular chilena en Venezuela… [con] pasaporte vigente o
vencido, otorgado a partir del año 2013.
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collapse in Venezuela, paired with the immense number of emigrants, has rendered it almost
impossible to obtain a renewed passport or a validated criminal background check.
On April 16, 2018, the first day that the VDR was offered, journalists in Caracas reported
that hundreds of Venezuelans were lined up outside the Chilean consulate, many of whom had
travelled long distances from other cities in hopes of obtaining legal authorization to live and
work in Chile. However, “there were no extra staff at the consulate and only about 20 people
with an appointment were permitted to enter” (Zerpa). The lack of solid institutionality in both
Chile and Venezuela and the restrictive requirements for solicitation have rendered the VDR
more or less insufficient in dealing with the influx of migrants. According to the Chilean General
Consulate in Caracas, roughly 20,000 people were granted the VDR in its first year of operation.
This number equates to less than 7 percent of Venezuelans living in Chile as of 2019 and is fewer
than the number of Venezuelans who entered Chile on tourist visas in the single month before the
VDR was announced (Guzman). Numerically, the Nueva Ley’s fix-all visa plan for the
Venezuelan crisis has not made much of a dent in logically or effectively regulating migrant
arrivals.
Chile’s Nueva Ley de Migración is an undeniably restrictive piece of legislation for the
express reason that it incorporates additional requirements onto existing policy. In seeking the
goal of “well-organized and regulated” migration, the law’s new visa classifications make it
harder, not easier, for migrants to obtain stable status in Chile, with the unintended consequence
of pushing thousands into irregular and precarious situations.
The restrictions contained in the Nueva Ley have not stopped the flow of Venezuelans
into Chile and, with the political and economic crisis continuing to worsen, more migrants are
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expected to enter Chile in 2019 than in any prior recorded year (International Organization for
Migration). Daniela Guzman, reporting for Bloomberg News in the months after the
implementation of the new visa system, argues that Venezuelans continue to arrive despite the
restrictions, only now they find themselves without immigration status, work authorization, or
full access to social safety nets:
People can’t wait for the consulates to provide these visas, so [Venezuelans] will continue
coming in as tourists… Far from preventing illegal immigration, [The Nueva Ley] may
force tens of thousands of undocumented Venezuelans to slip into the black economy.
(Guzman)
Lacking visa status, countless migrants will and have turned to the unregulated economy which
often leads to exploitation and abuse. Wages below the minimum wage, dangerous working
conditions, and arbitrary firings have all been reported in Chile. The consequences of a lack of
regular status reverberate far beyond the labor market. An investigation by the Washington Post
revealed that “there is also evidence of a worrying trend: Desperate Venezuelans, particularly
women, have become commodities to be bought and sold” (Falola). Many migrants with
irregular status are hesitant to seek legal and police support for fear of deportation, making them
easier targets for human trafficking and prostitution rings.
The restrictive nature of the Nueva Ley has unintentionally resulted in the exact matters it
was intended to prevent: hundreds of thousands of migrants with irregular status, countless
pushed into the black market or worse, and an increased rate of migrants entering the country.
Far from the more expansive efforts of previous administrations, the proposal put forth by
Sebastián Piñera’s conservative government is much more akin to Law 1.094 and the status-quo
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of restrictive immigration policy in Chile over the past four decades. Many aspects of the
policies in the Nueva Ley can be clearly traced to the framework provided by Law 1.094: the
criminalization of unauthorized entry, the requirement of a clean criminal record, and the
constant implied threat of deportation. At its core, the Nueva Ley is a document guided by the
National Security Doctrine as it treats migration as a phenomenon to be controlled, limited, and
viewed with distrust.
This underlying philosophy, enshrined by Law 1.094 and put into practice through the
Nueva Ley, has framed the discourse surrounding immigration in Chile and, to some extent,
shaped public sentiment. Since the first significant arrivals of migrants to Chile in the first years
of the 21st century, anti-immigrant sentiment has been steadily growing, in parallel to a
disturbing global trend. A 2017 survey showed that 41 percent of Chileans believe that migrants
increase crime, a 10 percent increase from 2015, and “just one-third agreed that immigrants were
good for the economy” (Doña-Reveco, “Chile Turns Rightward” 6).
These public sentiments have given rise to corresponding reactionary politics, most
notably in the far-right Partido Republicano led by José Antonio Kast. After a surprisingly
popular but ultimately unsuccessful presidential campaign in 2018, Kast has become the central
figure of the anti-immigration movement, often criticizing Piñera and the Nueva Ley as being too
lenient. In an op-ed published in July of 2019, Kast urged citizens and politicians to “stop
creating the illusion that Chile is a paradise for foreigners” and openly called for physical
barriers along the country’s northern borders with Peru and Bolivia (Kast)16. As an outspoken
defender of the Pinochet regime and the 1980 Constitution, Kast has often cited Law 1.094 as the
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best tool to restrict immigration to Chile and maintain a homogenized national identity. In
essence, the continuity of a 45 year old law passed under a dictatorship has not only guided the
policymaking that determines the fate of hundreds of thousands of migrants, but it also
emboldens the most extreme of public viewpoints to openly call for mass expulsions and
militarized borders.

Looking East: a Comparison with Argentina

Chile’s response to the Venezuelan migrant crisis, guided by the country’s authoritarian
vestiges, is just one example of restrictive reactions across Latin America. For many countries,
most of which have significantly fewer resources than Chile, the arrival of massive numbers of
Venezuelan migrants has stoked anti-immigrant rhetoric and prompted the adoption of more
conservative legislation. However, not all countries in the region have responded this way; some
have opened their doors, eased restrictions, and facilitated integration into society. In a striking
comparison to the development and current reality of the immigration framework in Chile, its
neighbor, Argentina, has opted for a human rights-based approach to the crisis, strengthening the
case that Chile’s failure to adequately serve its migrants is a matter of legal development rather
than state capacity.
Argentina experienced a neoliberal military dictatorship around the same time that Chile
did, but the Argentine junta lost power much earlier and in a significantly different way than
Pinochet’s junta. In his book State Terrorism in Latin America author Thomas C. Wright tracks
the decline of the Argentinian military junta, headed by Jorge Rafael Videla, from the economic
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crisis and the disastrous Falkland Island War of the early 1980’s to the widespread protests and
demands for elections in 1983. The junta, disgraced and discredited, ceded control back to
civilian government when Raúl Alfonsín was elected president in 1983. “In Argentina the
military left via the back door, assuming that the amnesty and memory of terror would assure its
impunity” but the relatively weak position of the military and pro-dictatorship right allowed the
resurgent democratic institutions to repeal protective measures, neoliberal policies, and immunity
for those who violated human rights (Wright, 127). Unlike Pinochet, who was forced to
relinquish control due to international pressure from liberal governments and human rights
groups rather than a resounding opposition within Chile and “remained firmly in control during
the transition,'' the Argentine junta quickly saw its policies and impacts expunged from
Argentine political society (Wright 84).
Perhaps the most important distinction between the cases of Chile and Argentina is that
the Argentine dictatorship never consolidated its power through a constitution, which has
allowed demcratic governments to repeal and replace authoritarian laws with significantly more
ease than in Chile. In addition, the congress drafted and ratified a robust and modern new
constitution in 1994, paving the way for progressive legal initiatives over the next two decades.
Regarding immigration, the clearest example of this can be seen in the case of what is known as
Ley Videla, its subsequent annulment, and the ratification of a new human rights-based
immigration law in 2004.
Colloquially named after the Argentine junta’s most emblematic leader, Ley Videla
(officially Law 22.439) is Argentina’s version of Chile’s Decree Law 1.094. Passed in 1981, this
law follows a restrictive and national security doctrine-oriented paradigm that “provided very
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few avenues for legal immigration,” cut off social services to migrants, and authorized the
government to reject, detain, or deport “subversives” or anyone with criminal antecedents (Hines
477). Much like Pinochet’s Law 1.094, Ley Videla created a hostile and precarious environment
for migrants and ultimately increased the number of irregular migrants within Argentina (Hines
477).
Following Argentina’s return to democracy in 1983, Ley Videla continued to be the
determinant for immigration policy, but with increasing rates of immigration to the country in the
late 90s and the growing importance of international human rights accords, congress faced
significant pressure from business sectors and civil society groups to scrap the law. Without
insurmountable supermajority requirements, the Argentine legislature was able to quickly and
effectively repeal Ley Videla and replace it with one of the most expansive and progressive
immigration laws in the Western Hemisphere: Law 25.871.
In a nearly unprecedented move, this 2004 law directly defines migration as a human
right: “the right to migrate is essential and inalienable to all persons and the Republic of
Argentina shall guarantee it based on principles of equality and universality” (Ley 25.871)17.
This bold declaration guides the stipulations of the law and provides an overarching framework
facilitating the entry and incorporation of migrants into Argentina. Barbara Hines, an
immigration legal scholar, summarizes just how progressive Law 25.871 really is:
The objectives of the law are to ensure that all persons who seek admission temporarily
or permanently enjoy the benefit of non-discriminatory admission criteria… [and]
develop immigration policies and strategies in order to comply with international
17
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obligations... [but] it is broader in scope than the [UN] International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers. (Hines 488-9)
The law also affords significant rights to migrants with irregular status, and states that “ in no
case can migratory irregularity of a foreigner impede their admission as a student [nor] restrict
access or rights to healthcare or social assistance” (Ley 25.871)18. At its core, this law treats
migrants with dignity and respect while recognizing their right to free movement, education,
healthcare, and work. It is with this framework that Argentina has enacted one of the most
progressive and welcoming responses to the Venezuelan crisis.
The sweeping provisions of Law 25.871 have allowed the Argentine migration authorities
to draft specific policies with the intention of easing the arrival and integration process for
thousands of Venezuelans. Since the beginning of the crisis, Argentina has received fewer
Venezuelan arrivals than Chile, about 130,000 as of late 2018 compared to Chile’s 288,000, but
the rates of arrival have been increasing throughout 2019 (Cullen). In January 2019 the
administration of Mauricio Macri, a center-right president more or less akin to Chile’s Piñera,
announced the creation of the Assistance to Venezuelan Migrants Programme (AVMP) with the
goal of “facilitating the arrival to the territory, the regulation of migratory condition and [the]
social insertion [of Venezuelans] into the community” (Buenos Aires Times).
In many ways, the specifics of the AVMP run directly contrary to Chile’s Nueva Ley and
the VDR. The program allows Venezuelans to enter Argentina with nothing more than a national
ID card or a passport, and either can be expired. While a criminal background check is required
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for permanent residency, it can be solicited online from within Argentina. All visa and residency
applications can be filled out at the border or even from within the country after arrival, saving
thousands the need to wait months for documents from the defunct Venezuelan bureaucracies.
The recognition of the “inability among Venezuelans to provide complete documentation” has
vastly reduced the number of migrants with irregular status within Argentina, and allowed for a
mutually beneficial integration (Buenos Aires Times). In the labor sphere, many public and
private universities in Argentina have implemented equivalency programs, allowing Venezuelans
to verify their degrees and gain the necessary credentials to work in the legal, medical, and other
specialized fields (Buenos Aires Times).
In summary, despite sharing significant similarities in historical development and
migration trends with Chile, Argentina’s response to the Venezuelan crisis is distinctly more
humane, rational, and successful. Just as the disenfranchisement of irregular migrants in Chile is
a result of restrictive legislation, the relative success of Venezuelans in Argentina can be
attributed to the expansive and progressive policies that guide their entry and integration.
The key factor in explaining such disparate policies is the constitutions of the two
countries. Argentina’s ability to amend the authoritarian legal vestiges of their dictatorship and
draft a modern national charter lies in the dictatorship’s lack of legal enshrinement through a
constitution of their own. Conversely, Chile is very much still playing by Pinochet’s rules when
it comes to government procedure. The 1980 Constitution of Chile has resulted in bipartisan
inability to craft a proactive and involved state in Chile, and those who have and will continue to
suffer the consequences of this are migrants, minorities, and the poor. However, for the first time
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in a long time, Chile now has a chance to turn the page on authoritarianism and offer real support
to Venezuelans and Chileans alike.

Looking Forward: Current Protests and a New Constitution

In early October 2019, a 30 peso (approximately $.03) increase in Santiago’s metro fare
ignited widespread and multifaceted protests across Chile. What began as students protesting the
fare hike by jumping turnstiles has since come to be a reckoning with Chile’s sustained
inequality and neoliberal economic model. A purely numbers-based economic look at Chile’s
development over the past 2 decades points to a considerable success story, especially in
comparison to many other Latin American nations, but the reality of socioeconomic and
political performance within the country tells a different tale. Alan Angell sums up the
underlying factors that have led to the tremendous protests of 2019:
The story of Chile as conveyed in the opinion polls is one of relatively low levels of
satisfaction with the performance of democracy, low levels of trust in the major
institutions of government and questions of its commitment to equity, given the unequal
distribution of income. (Angell 191-3)
Much of Chile’s economic and social inequality has deep roots in the hierarchies established in
the early days of the colonies and protected during the reign of the dictatorship. While overall
GDP has increased and poverty rates have fallen since the return to democracy, many claim that
social mobility has remained stagnant due to privatized welfare and pension programs, high costs
of education, and the continuity of Pinochet’s constitution.
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In recent months, protestors have focused their demands on the 1980 constitution, the
neoliberalism it protects, and the possibility of writing a new one. Many lower and middle class
people see a clear connection between their grievances and the nation’s current charter, and
rightly so. Protocols on issues ranging from healthcare access and political representation to
water allocation and retirement pensions are specifically determined by the 1980 constitution, in
a model that “hands the markets responsibility for what other models delegate to the
government… [and] constructs a welfare state with an incredibly limited capacity” (Bartlett). At
its core, Pinochet’s Constitution has and continues to achieve its goal of enshrining the policies
of the dictatorship and vastly limiting the power of the democratic government.
On November 15, 2019, nearly a month after the start of the protests, President Piñera
and his cabinet announced a plan in collaboration with opposition lawmakers to pave a path
towards a new constitution. In April 2020, the government will hold a national plebiscite “asking
Chileans if they want a new constitution and how they would like it to be drafted” (Bartlett). The
congress has agreed upon two possible routes for drafting the document, should the monumental
undertaking be approved by the public. In the first option, an assembly would be convened with
half of the members coming from the congress and half being chosen from the general public.
The second option would vest the power in an entirely public assembly.
According to CADEM, one of Chile’s most respected polling agencies, over 78 percent
of Chileans say that the country needs a new constitution. Of the reasons cited, 32 percent of
citizens asked say that a new constitution is needed to “establish a new social contract with the
people” and another 20 percent cite the fact that the 1980 constitution was “originated under
dictatorship”. Other reasons include the desire to “generate real changes” and “guarantee a
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minimum of social rights” (CADEM)19. Though mass protests continue and many have called for
Piñera’s resignation, the bipartisan effort to give citizens a voice in the future of their country
represents an important, albeit long overdue, turning point in the precedent of Chilean politics.
The constitutional plebiscite also offers an opportunity for the government and people of
Chile to reaffirm their commitment to human rights and social solidarity, this time towards
migrants. Migrants, especially those in vulnerable positions, are particularly affected by the
constitution’s status quo in Chile; not only does an antiquated and restrictive immigration law
limit their options for legal entry, but the lack of a robust welfare state leaves thousands without
secure access to healthcare, education, and housing once they arrive. Administrations past and
present have had their hands tied in building a more equitable society for Chileans and
immigrants alike, and since the country’s return to democracy in the 1990s none have been able
to deliver significant reform on immigration. At each turn, the constitution’s supermajority
requirements and authoritarian enclaves have prevented the replacement of Law 1.094 and
defanged any progressive executive policy.
Now, at the peak of an unprecedented humanitarian and immigration crisis in the region,
Chile’s framework for responding to the arrival of hundreds of thousands of migrants is little
more than an increasingly restrictive fortification of Law 1.094. The ratification of a new
constitution could very well be a turning point in Chile’s immigration policy and a rare
opportunity to build a more effective and humane plan from the ground up. Without the shadow
of Law 1.094 and its restrictive philosophy looming at the legal core of the matter, the Chilean
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government can catch up to where it needs to be with a modern and human rights-oriented law
that has significantly more staying power than a hodgepodge of executive actions.

Analysis and Conclusion

Looking closely at the contemporary history of immigration law in Chile is vital to
understanding the present situation in the country. The reality that is unfolding at the borders and
in the cities has not developed in a vacuum, but is rather the culmination of a turbulent and
varied process of political transition and legal precedent. While the administration of Sebastián
Piñera has exacerbated the issue of migrant precarity through restrictive executive policy, the
issue at its core is more than 40 years old and lies in the inherited and authoritarian constitutional
system bequeathed by the military dictatorship. It is true that no one could have predicted such a
large flow of migrants across Latin America in the 1970’s, but the philosophy of Pinochet’s 1975
Law 1.094 takes a strongly anti-migrant stance that has guided Chile’s policy well into the 21st
century.
First, it is important to reiterate the significance of Chile’s 1980 Constitution and the
extent to which it continues to sway business as usual politics in the country. Alan Angell
describes the “authoritarian enclaves” of the constitution in his book Democracy After Pinochet:
Politics, Parties and Elections in Chile: designated senators, disproportionate electoral rules that
favor the right, undue supremacy of the armed forces, enshrined neoliberal policies, and sky high
supermajority requirements to amend the constitution and overturn certain laws. These vestiges
of the dictatorship have prevented significant forward motion in many aspects of Chilean society
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- everything from prosecuting human rights abuses to changing the pension system - and have
made the ruling piece of immigration legislation, Law 1.094, virtually untouchable.
Law 1.094 is the Chilean military dictatorship’s keystone on immigration policy,
unilaterally drafted and enacted in 1975 within the context of the Cold War and the National
Security Doctrine. The law views migrants as potential criminals that should be kept out rather
than integrated into society. It militarizes the Chilean border and makes obtaining residency or
visa status laborious and expensive. Lastly, this law places extreme authority and powers of
discretion in the executive, establishing a precedent for decades of patchwork policy that has
changed with almost every administration. 44 years later, Law 1.094 is still the guiding national
law regarding immigration despite numerous attempts to repeal it and an approximately 450
percent increase in migrant arrivals to the country (International Organization for Migration).
Law 1.094 and the 1980 Constitution that protects it have created a system that is tepid
towards migrants at best and hostile at worst. Piñera’s Nueva Ley is little more than a modern
update of Law 1.094 and pushes tens of thousands of Venezuelan migrants into precarious
situations by restricting visa access and regularization opportunities. Given the continuity of Law
1.094 and an authoritarian constitution, Chile’s current response to the Venezuelan migration
crisis was unavoidable. A progressive and pragmatic policy that effectively processes and
integrates a large number of migrant arrivals cannot coexist with such a conservative law. Even
in spirit, the continuity of Pinochet’s policies is holding Chile back from showing true support
and solidarity with the people of Venezuela.
The only way for Chile to implement comprehensive and progressive immigration reform
is to ratify a new constitution. The country’s current constitution is too effective at protecting
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itself from reform and ensuring the continuity of neoliberal and national security
doctrine-oriented policy to facilitate progressive initiatives. The development of immigration
policy in Argentina is a compelling example of what kind of modern and robust policy is
possible with a democratically sound constitution, and can provide a template for the next stage
in Chile’s legal and political evolution. The recent events in Chile are a clear rejection of the
status quo that has contributed to maintained inequality and mistreatment of migrants. The
upcoming constitutional referendum puts the future of Chile into the hands of its citizens and
presents a golden opportunity to firmly reject the authoritarianism that has haunted the country
for over fifty years and finally provide an effective and ethical immigration framework that
welcomes migrants into the social fabric of the country.
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